. Lobster stocks around the world support high-value fisheries with production currently about 260,000 tonnes annually. The largest fisheries harvest Homarus, Nephrops and Panulirus species with smaller production from the Jasus, Palinurus and Scylarid species groups. The majority of larger industrial fisheries have systems limiting fishing effort or catches, while many of the smaller fisheries remain open access and have yet to implement basic management controls. The review uses the Western Australian fishery for Panulirus cygnus, valued between AUS$200 -400 million annually with a long history of successful management, as a case study for the consideration of lobster fisheries management systems more generally. The conclusions from the review suggest that an evolutionary approach to management with biological controls as a precursor to input-based controls is necessary to allow sufficient fishery-based data to be accumulated for management decision processes to be effective. The case study experience suggests that well-defined fishing rights leading to an input-based total allowable effort system with individually transferable effort (ITE) units can provide efficient mechanisms for the reduction of latent effort, which characterises most lobster fisheries with open access or basic limited entry. Further the system has been shown to be capable of generating significant license values for fishermen while maintaining owner-operators as the dominant group in the fishery. The ITE system was also used effectively to adjust fishing to compensate for a severe environmentally-driven downturn in recruitment, but resulted in highly complex management rules. In 2010 the fishery moved seamlessly to a total allowable catch with individually transferable quotas which removed the complexity of management, further increased the catch value and reduced costs of fishing. Price/ earnings (P/E) ratios have been used to track trends in license values which highlight the industry's increasing economic viability over time under both input and output based management.
Introduction
Lobster stocks around the world support catches in the order of 260 000 t annually (FAO STATS, 2011) which are taken by a range of fishing activities from artisanal fishing in many tropical regions to industrial fisheries in temperate and cold waters . Lobsters are commercially taken mostly using traps, but also by trawling and diving, are highly valued in the world seafood market and also prized by recreational fishers.
Most large commercial fisheries initially relied on the biological control measures of minimum size limits and protection of egg-bearing females to maintain breeding stocks and many later developed forms of effort or catch controls to maintain stock levels. In contrast, many of the smaller fisheries, particularly in tropical Africa and Asia, remain open access, have limited capacity to control fishing and have yet to implement basic biological protection measures. Stocks in these fisheries are likely to be suffering from growth and possibly recruitment overfishing, but can continue to operate at depressed catch rates because of the high value of lobsters and low costs of fishing in developing economies.
The first recorded direct control on lobster catches was in South Africa during the 1940s, when lobster tail quotas were set for the industrial fishery for Jasus lalandii (Melville-Smith and van Sittert, 2005) . Later in the mid-1950s, the alternative approach of limiting fishing effort to indirectly control catches of Panulirus argus began in Mexico, when fishers' cooperatives along the coast were issued with exclusive lobster-fishing rights (Briones-Fourzan and LozanoAlvarez, 2000) . In the early 1960s, the first control on fishing vessel and pot (trap) numbers occurred when limited entry management was introduced in the Western Australian (WA) fishery for Panulirus cygnus (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) , an approach later adopted by many fisheries in developed economies. From these initial measures to control lobster catches, more market-based management systems using freely tradable pot quotas in Western Australia (de Lestang et al., 2010) and catch quotas in the New Zealand and now most Australian fisheries have been developed and are providing significant improvements in economic performance .
Against this background, it is notable that most of the larger trapbased fisheries (see reviews in Phillips, 2013) continue to rely heavily on biological measures to maintain their lobster breeding stocks. In terms of controls on lobster catches, basic limits on effort remain the most common form of management being applied in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Chile, and Japan, where about two-thirds of the world lobster harvest occurs. The largest lobster fishery where output controls, i.e. a total allowable catch (TAC), are used is the multinational European trawl fishery for Nephrops (Bell et al., 2013) and this system is also now applied to most lobster trap fisheries in New Zealand and Australia and South Africa.
For most fisheries, management is focused on sustaining maximum catches rather than on the economic performance with the main exceptions being the fisheries in New Zealand and Australia, where fully market-based versions of the total allowable effort (TAE) [with individually transferable effort (ITEs)] and TAC [with individually transferable quotas (ITQs)] management have been implemented with a strong emphasis on maximizing economic performance Reid et al., 2013; Caputi et al., 2015) .
The primary purpose of this review is to assess the performance of the alternative input and output-based management systems for lobster fisheries using the Western Australian fishery for P. cygnus as a case study. This is Australia's most valuable single-species fishery generating between AUS$200 and 400 million annually (Reid et al., 2013) and has been the subject of comprehensive biological research and management since 1963 (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) . Over this period, the initial limited-entry system evolved into a sophisticated TAE control system with ITE units issued to each vessel (de Lestang et al., 2012) , which allowed the fishery to operate close to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels and to generate significant licence values for fishers. More recently (2010), this fishery was converted to TAC management with a strategy of targeting maximum economic yield (MEY; Caputi et al., 2014b Caputi et al., , 2015 . This provides a unique opportunity to compare the operation of the two alternative control systems on the same fishery and also illustrates the way these more market-based management strategies impact both lobster stocks and industry economic performance. For this latter purpose, a new approach for valuing commercial fishing rights, using a licence transfer price to earnings (P/E) ratio method, has been developed and used to track licence values through several decades of the effort management and since the implementation of a TAC with ITQs.
Western Australian lobster fishery case study
Background
The western rock lobster P. cygnus is an endemic Australian species occurring along the west coast where it supports a large fishery operating from Shark Bay (268S) in the north to Cape Leeuwin (348S) in the south and around the Abrolhos Islands (28-29.58S) on the continental shelf edge (Figure 1 ). This fishery produced around 11 000 t annually from the 1980s to early 2000s, although the catches have been significantly reduced by management action to around 6000 t since 2008/2009 to adjust for lower recruitment (puerulus settlement) resulting from environmental changes (Caputi et al., 2014c; de Lestang et al., 2015) . The stock also supports an important licensed recreational fishery taking several hundred tonnes annually (Melville-Smith et al., 2004) under catch share arrangements (de Lestang et al., 2012) .
Since 1949, the commercial fishery has been documented through industry landing records and detailed research logbooks since 1963. Additional information from puerulus settlement (1968 onwards), observer programmes (starting 1971), and fisheryindependent spawning stock surveys (1991 onward) have provided particularly detailed databases for the fishery. Stock assessments using these data underpin management processes and have contributed to the fishery being the first certified by the Marine Stewardship Council in 2000 (de Lestang et al., 2012) . 
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Early management development (pre-1993-1994) The history of the fishery records that minimum size limits and spawner protection measures were first introduced in the late 1890s (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) . By the 1930s, annual catches were around 250 t and reached 1000 t in the late 1940s after a market was developed for frozen lobster tails in the United States (Brown, 1991) . This led to a rapid expansion of fishing through the 1950s and early 1960s, until some levelling out of catches and the threat of an influx of vessels from outside of the state, led to a WA Government decision to limit vessels numbers in 1963 (Bowen, 1980) . These initial controls on fishing effort occurred through duplicated State and Federal Government legislation; however, since 1980, the fishery has operated solely under WA (State) control following an Offshore Constitutional Settlement (Anon., 1980) which simplified the management processes.
While the initial decision to limiting vessels to 858 was quickly implemented, it immediately raised concerns that pot (trap) numbers would increase and an additional rule limiting pots to three per foot of boat length (10 m
21
) with a maximum holding of 200 pots was introduced. Although this capped pot numbers at 76 000, fishers then responded by trying to replace their existing vessels with larger ones to increase their pot holdings and led to a policy (1965) only allowing the same length replacement vessels. A simultaneous decision to phase out offshore processing vessels suspected of undertaking illegal activities occurred and was facilitated by allowing them to redistribute their pot entitlements in small parcels to other fishers wanting to operate larger replacement vessels.
The administrative process to allow replacement vessels and purchase of additional pots involved the buyer and seller submitting evidence of the sale to the Fisheries Agency, which would then recognize the ownership change and link the associated pot entitlements to the new vessel. This by default led to the "transferability" of the licence or "right to fish" for lobsters. Although these pot licences initially had little value, the vessel sale prices soon began to involve an additional "goodwill" payment of around the value of 1 year's catch by the number of pots being transferred (Bowen, 1980) .
Although the vessel and pot numbers were controlled, nominal fishing effort measured as "pot lifts" continued to increase through the 1970s and1980s and the effectiveness of fishing gear was also increasing (Brown, 1991) . This led to additional controls on pot size and a requirement for multiple escape gaps. Despite these measures, effort and catches continued to increase partly due to the increasing efficiency (Brown et al., 1995) , but also due to a series of high catch years and improved juvenile survival from better handing of released undersize lobsters (Brown and Caputi, 1986) .
While these additional controls slowed the rate of increase in the catch, the number of pot lifts continued to expand (Figure 2 ) as larger replacement vessels were able to work more days during the fishing season. To specifically address this issue of "effort creep", (Brown, 1991) .
Development of sophisticated effort management systems
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were considerable improvements in fish-finding equipment (colour echosounders and GPS plotters) that enabled fishers to better target lobsters in deep water where most of the breeding stock resides (Hall and Chubb, 2001) . To compensate for the resulting decline in breeding stocks possibly related to lower puerulus settlements, a controversial management package was introduced in 1993/1994. This increased the minimum size by 1 mm, extended protection from berried females to all mature females exhibiting egg-bearing setae, and "temporarily" reduced the number of pots that could be used by each licensed vessel by 18%. This move to "variable pot usage" was the effective start of the full TAE with ITEs management system which was formalized in 2001, when each vessel's pot holding was converted to ITE "units". The 68 961 units issued corresponding to the number of pots in use before the 1993/1994 package and effectively fixed the "share" of the fishery that each vessel operator would have access to in the future. The 18% pot reduction was then applied as a "pot usage ratio" (0.82) to each vessel's ITE unit holding, to determine the number of pots which could be deployed for that season. (Note: reference to TAE or TAC management also implies individually transferable units of effort or catch are in use.) The TAE at that time then became the maximum pot lifts permitted, i.e. the total number of pots in use (68 961 units×0.82) multiplied by the fishing days during the season (227) or 12.8 million pot lifts. This annual TAE since the start of limited entry (Figure 2 ) compared with the actual effort in pot-lifts each year shows that the fleet had considerable scope to increase effort under the rules, when the initial controls were enacted in 1963. This "latent" or unutilized effort capacity (Hall and Brown, 2000) was mostly created by the increased seagoing capacity of replacement vessels and the advent of technology for offshore fishing not available to the original fleet. While the series of management decisions to reduce effort through the 1970s and 1980s had some impact on this increasing fleet capacity, it was not until the 1993/1994 management changes that latent effort was effectively removed from the fishery (Figure 2) .
A further small adjustment to the TAE ( (Caputi et al., 2014c; de Lestang et al., 2015) . These latter effort reductions (.70%) represented a proactive management response, being introduced before the poor puerulus year classes reached the legal size for fishing, i.e. 3 -4 years later. As a result of this emergency process, the TAE was reduced to around 2.2 million pot lifts with the objective of achieving a target catch of 5500 t in future years (Reid et al., 2013) . The rules negotiated with industry to achieve this outcome were, however, very complex and varied between management zones. These included different pot usage rates, closed periods, limits on fishing days each week, and alterations to minimum and maximum sizes, together with uniform changes to escape gaps (Department of Fisheries, 2011). Predictably, the large reduction in TAE also had a significant impact on vessel numbers which declined from around 460 to 280 vessels over the 2 years ( Figure 3 ) and contributed significantly to the decrease ( 70%) since the start of limited entry.
The reduction in TAE was successful in lowering the catch to 7470 and then 5770 t in the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 seasons, respectively (Figure 2 ), well down from the forecast catches from the three zones (Figure 4 ) in aggregate totalling 9900 and 8900 t had the effort continued at 2007/2008 levels. This resulted in a significant carry-over of legal stock into the years affected by the very low recruitment, a substantial increase in catch rate from around 1 to 2.5 kg pot lift 21 and breeding stocks reaching historically high levels (Caputi et al., 2014c) . In addition, the effort of ,3 million pot lifts had the fortuitous effect of moving the fishery close to the MEY level previously projected (Reid et al., 2013) . This lower effort and fleet size automatically reduced operating costs and the smaller lobster supply increased prices such that total fishery revenue did not decrease substantially and profitability increased, despite the lower catches (Reid et al., 2013) .
While the TAE changes implemented in 2008/2009 and 2009/ 2010 achieved their objectives, the industry negotiation process to tailor management to regional needs proved particularly difficult and the resulting fishing arrangements were complex to administer and enforce. Some of these controls also required frequent stock assessments, real-time monitoring of catch, and adjustments midseason to ensure the fishery achieved the nominal target catch. For these reasons, the TAE changes created significant industry debate, uncertainty, and costs which ultimately contributed to the Government's unilateral decision to simplify management by directly setting a TAC and adopting ITQs. This occurred despite a lack of overall industry support at the time, although there had been industry consultation and debate in the preceding years; J. Kennedy, pers. comm. (Fisheries Department, Manager West Coast Lobster Fishery). In fact, first detailed consideration of a TAC with ITQs had started in the early 1990s (Bowen, 1994) without ever achieving majority industry support.
Conversion of fishery from TAE to TAC management
The management change to a TAC with ITQs occurred at the start of the 2010/2011 season (de Lestang et al., 2012) and was simplified by direct conversion of the ITE units to ITQ units, so that the share of the fishery held by each owner remained the same. While the one-to-one conversion disadvantaged the more efficient fishers who had historically achieved above-average catch per ITE unit, some of these operators were supportive and accepted the situation to enable a quicker transition to the new system and expected economic benefits. The existing target catch (notional TAC) used to set the TAE was also adopted as the actual TAC for the first 2 years of the new system. The smooth transition was also assisted by retaining most of the existing gear controls to minimize disruption to vessel operations, although pot usage rates were relaxed back to 50% of the unit holding and the season was extended by 6 weeks.
In addition to the anticipated reduction in operating costs, the TAC with ITQ system had a significant impact on catch value. While the previous catch reduction to 5500 t under the TAE system generated a useful price increase ( Figure 5 ) of around US$5-7 kg 21 resulting from essentially all of the reduced catch being exported live at premium prices, the move to a TAC had a more significant impact (Reid et al., 2013; Caputi et al., 2014b) . This event corresponded to an approximate US$10 kg 21 additional
Review of lobster fishery management i25 increase in price ( Figure 5 ), as the longer season allowed fishers to reduce catches during high abundance periods with depressed prices and target periods of high demand. Highgrading to select preferred market sized also contributed to the price increase with limited negative impact as lobsters handled correctly suffer little discard mortality (Brown and Caputi, 1986) . The full 12-month season introduced in 2013 also corresponded to further price rises ( Figure 5 ) of about US$7 -8 kg 21 (Caputi et al., 2014b) , although this may have also been influenced by greater demand for lobsters.
[Note: Reid et al. (2013) reported beach (dockside) prices converted to US dollars to minimize the impact of Australian dollar exchange rate variations, as essentially all of the catch is exported and marketed under contracts in US$.]
Overall, the conversion of the fishery from a TAE (with ITEs) to a TAC (with ITQs) has had a significant economic benefit and simplified the management arrangements in the fishery. MEY has been formally added to the management plan for fishery in 2014, in addition to sustainability objectives. Second, the very conservative TAC adopted initially for sustainability reasons, has also minimized the inherent risks of this control system where the catch available can be highly variable, and overestimates of stock abundance can lead to breeding stock depletion. The implementation process for the TAC (with ITQs) in the fishery also benefited greatly from the longstanding catch prediction system (Caputi et al., 2014a) , which had also allowed industry to be restructured in advance of the forecast low catch period from 2010 to 2011 onwards. Further, the historical reliability of the forecasts, which could only have been developed under the TAE system, provided industry with confidence that their catch quotas would be achieved and the fishery would remain sustainable under the new TAC system.
Fishery licence valuations
The early adoption of licence transferability resulted in pot licences having a sale value and created a small "windfall" profit for the original vessel operators. This generated considerable debate at the time about the associated capital costs and particularly about their inhibiting new fishers from entering the fishery (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) . Despite these concerns, lobster pot values continued to increase over time from several hundred AUS dollars in the early 1970s to around AUS$10 000 per pot unit by 1992/1993 (Penn et al., 1997) with industry adapting to the changed situation. Prices further increased after the 1993/1994 management package to around AUS$26 000 in 1995/1996 when the effort reduction improved catch rates and created additional demand for pots. Prices later peaked at AUS$36 000 during early 2000s before falling to around AUS$10 000 when forecast catches were in steep decline and before the change to ITQs, when values again returned to the previous highs, i.e. above AUS $30 000. While the overall increase in pot or unit prices has been significant over time, the values obtained have also been affected by other factors unrelated to the management performance of the fishery, e.g. inflation rates, large exchange variations relative to export market destinations, and increasing fuel costs. These outside influences on pot unit prices make it difficult to relate the values achieved to the economic performance of the fishery over time and also make comparisons with other lobster fisheries less reliable.
In a more general context, these prices paid for pot units traded through the licence register set up under the Fisheries Act are an equivalent to "stock market" prices where the fishery as a whole is equivalent to a listed "company" and the ITE or ITQ units are effectively "shares" in that company. On this basis, the more conventional approach of valuing company shares (in this case, fishery units) has been adopted by using the ratio of the prices paid for a unit relative to the expected earnings from a unit. The use of a purchase price to earnings (P/E) ratio better reflects the underlying performance of the fishery (company) and allows easier comparison with other fisheries. This valuation approach is essentially the same basic method used by financial analysts (Campbell and Shiller, 1988) to value listed corporations, except for the use of income from the season following purchase rather than the reported income for the previous period. This variation to the conventional method was adopted because the catch prediction system for the fishery (Figure 4 ) has provided the purchaser with a particularly reliable forecast of the catch by a unit and lobster processors provide some guidance on market prices before the season start when sales typically occur. Purchasers are more likely to use these forecasts to guide their decisions than rely solely on the previous season's catch or price outcomes. In this context, the P/E ratio valuations for lobster fishery units are an indication of the "market" view of the future profit stream from ownership of the units and the long-term sustainability of a fishery. This method also formalizes the system historically used by the WA Fishery Agency when comparing the performance of different fisheries and by some bankers when assessing fishers' loan applications.
The time-series of P/E ratios created using this method for the fishery (Figure 6 ) show that valuations were initially relatively low (,1) through the early 1970s reflecting the uncertainty about the fishery at that time. However, by the early 1980s, when illegal Review of lobster fishery management i27 activity, including the sale of undersize lobsters and use of pots more than licence numbers (de Lestang et al, 2012) had been effectively eliminated and the underlying economics of the fishery became better known, the P/E ratios had moved up to the 2 -3 range. (Note: the P/E ratios reflect the expectation of cumulative future profits flowing from the ownership of the fishing rights in perpetuity.) The first pot reduction programme (1986/1987-1991/1992) further improved the fishery's economic performance and created additional demand for pots from fishers wanting to bring their vessels back to full design capacity, i.e. add back the 10% of pots lost which effectively increased their share of the fishery. A further major increase in value occurred after the 1993/1994 management changes which reduced pot usage by 18%, and corresponded to the P/E ratio reaching new highs between 6 and 8 from 1995 to 1997 (Figure 6 ). This increase was again the result of market demand from successful and "efficient" operators buying additional ITE units and others taking the opportunity of high pot values to retire from the fishery. These generally higher P/E ratios also corresponded to improved puerulus settlement (Caputi et al., 2014c) which indicated increasing catches over the next 3 -4 years and influenced the ability of fishers to borrow to purchase additional units. The P/E ratios from the late 1990s onwards became more volatile as the fishers responded more directly to changes in puerulus settlement (Figure 7 ) based forecasts (Figure 4 ) and the lobster supply-export price relationship ( Figure 5 ) became better known. While the P/E decline in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 corresponded to the record lows in puerulus settlement, it was notable that the radical management decision to cut the TAE from 2008 to 2009 onwards and carry forward catches into years affected by low puerulus settlement had an immediate impact on the industry confidence, with the effect that the P/E ratio stabilized (Figure 6 ). Despite the ongoing stock uncertainties, the resulting improvement in catch rates, lower fishing costs and increased lobster export prices, corresponded to a slight upturn in values, which continued after the change to ITQ management in 2010/2011 season ( Figure 5 ). The associated lobster price increases and further lowering of costs under ITQs all appear to have contributed to the P/E ratios returning to the previous highs of 6-8 (under the TAE) and then moving to above 9 ( Figure 6 ). The P/E ratio is expected to remain at these higher levels, given the increased certainty in catches and ongoing improvements in lobster price under the more flexible ITQ fishing system.
Ownership of fishing rights in Western Australian fishery
The issue of lobster licence ownership became of concern to both Western Australian fisheries administrators and industry leaders, when limited-entry licences began to assume significant values (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) . However, despite the lack of specific controls on who could own lobster fishing licences, ownership outside of the Western Australian fishing community has not become a feature of the fishery to date. While licence ownership controls were not imposed, there was until recently a legislated requirement that lobster processing companies (also historically subject to limited licences) were majority (80%) Australian owned to control offshore ownership and the associated possibility for transfer pricing to minimize Australian taxes.
This lack of corporate ownership persisted through the effort management period, despite the presence of one multinational corporation processing lobsters and operating vessels, when limited entry was first introduced. This company was allocated vessel licences in the initial 1963 allocation, but was using employee skippers and found its fleet operation was unprofitable. The company later sold the vessels and ultimately its processing licence. Since then, larger corporations and public companies have not become involved in the fishery through the effort-management period (to 2010), despite the fishery's history of profitability. More recently, some private family-based companies have purchased additional vessels and successfully operated small fleets, mostly using family or independent skippers on equitable share fishing arrangements. Overall, the majority of licences have remained under individual or owner operator control under small family-based company structures.
This situation may be gradually changing due to the practise of leasing of fishing licences which was formalized under the Fisheries Act in 1994 (FRMA, 1994) and became more prevalent following the 1993/1994 management changes which resulted in a significant decrease in vessel numbers. As a result of this ongoing fleet reduction process, many owners retiring their vessels from the fishery now prefer to lease (rather than sell) their units so as to maintain an income stream and retain the option to re-enter the fishery in the future. This trend to lease rather than sell units has continued under the ITQ system and is expected to increase based on the scope for further fleet reductions and increases in unit values under this system. While many ex-fishers currently retain the fishing rights through leasing, ultimately this process is likely to result in more non-fisher ownership of the lobster fishing rights through inter-generational transfers.
Discussion

Application of input and output-based management to lobster fisheries
For input-based management, the catchability and behaviour of the species being harvested can influence the directness of the relationship between the fishing effort and catch achieved and is a primary consideration for management. While for most lobster fisheries including the case study fishery, short-term variations in catchability related to moulting and lunar phase can be expected (Wright et al., 2006) ; there is typically a reasonable relationship between annual effort applied and catch achieved, such that input-based systems can generally operate effectively. An exception to this is where lobster species undergo mass migrations, e.g. P. cygnus (de Lestang et al., 2012) and P. argus (Kanciruk and Herrnkind, 1978) , and during those events, lobsters can be highly aggregated, such that the catches obtained are poorly related to the effort being applied at that time. During these short periods, e.g. the "whites" migration in the case study fishery (Melville-Smith et al., 1998) , input-based management is less effective in controlling catches and this was one of the factors which influenced the case study fishery decision to move to output-based management. Figure 6 . The TAE and unit licence valuations (P/E ratios) for the western rock lobster fishery from the early 1970s to the present, including the periods under basic limited entry management (1970 /1971 -1992 /1993 ), TAE with ITE unit management (1993 /2010 ), and TAC with ITQ management (2010 . The 2014/2015 estimates are preliminary. Note: The P/E ratio uses the catch value achieved by a unit in the season following purchase.
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The degree of variability in annual catch available or "recruitment to the fishery" also affects the way the alternative management control systems operate. For example, where there is high variability in recruitment to the fishery, the setting of a precise catch quota (TAC) is inherently more difficult and errors in the forecast of the annual catch available are more likely. Further, as in the case study fishery, variability in recruitment to the fishery can also be significant between regions, i.e. is much higher in the south (C Zone, Figure 4 ), which further complicated management decision processes. Where these more variable recruitment to the fishery situations occur, input (effort-based) controls provide a lower risk management strategy as the catch achieved tends to self-correct when errors in stock abundance estimates occur. That is, with effort and exploitation rate relatively fixed, the catch achieved more closely reflects the underlying abundance, and leaves a relatively constant proportion of the stock after fishing each year. Conversely, the application of output-based (catch) controls to fisheries with high catch variability is a higher risk strategy whenever stock levels are overestimated, as uncontrolled effort can expand to achieve a TAC set high and reduce residual stock with potential impacts on breeding stocks.
For these reasons, tropical Panulirus lobster stocks with typically higher variability in recruitment to the fishery (due to faster growth and shorter life cycles often resulting in a single year class dominating the catch each year) are generally better suited to the "selfcorrecting" effort-based management systems. This is particularly relevant where stocks are heavily fished or a strategy targeting MSY is adopted, as was historically the situation in the case study fishery.
Alternatively, the longer-lived, slower-growing lobster species occurring in temperate to cold waters can be expected to have less variable recruitment to the fishery (i.e. more year classes contribute to each year's catch) such that errors in assessing the stock levels available for TAC setting purposes are less likely. Because such longlived species have lower natural mortalities, there is also little penalty from setting conservative TACs and allowing fishable stock to carryover to future years. From this perspective, output-based management is likely to be more suitable for the cold-water fisheries for the Homarus, Palinurus, and Jasus lobster groups. Although catch quotas are also applied to sections of the European Nephrops trawl fishery (Bell et al., 2013) , this shorter-lived group is likely to be suitable for either form of management.
The third factor influencing the effectiveness of the management strategy adopted is the ability to collect data from the fishery to support the management decision processes. For example, in an open access fishery situation, excess fishing capacity is likely to have developed and there are often insufficient fishery catch data for a manager to do other than implement some basic input controls to stabilize the situation. In practical terms, the initial use of input controls as occurred in the case study fishery resulted in fishing effort applied consistently to the stock and enabled a comprehensive time-series of low cost fisherydependent catch and effort data to be developed. The availability of these data was critical to decisions to limit entry (Bowen and Hancock, 1989 ) and later assessments of fishing power (Brown et al., 1995) needed to adjust the effort levels. These data issues generally make input controls and fishery-dependent data gathering a useful precursor to the implementation of output-based control systems. Conversely, ITQ management designed to allow individual vessels to fish to market demand usually leads to the inconsistent application of effort, highgrading, and the need for higher cost fisheryindependent survey data to support decision processes.
These issues suggest that input controls are more suitable for most lobster stocks initially, particularly those with open access and excess fishing capacity. Similarly, data-poor lobster fisheries are likely to benefit from an initial input management phase as a precursor to more sophisticated controls being considered.
Management implementation in lobster fisheries
A reason commonly given for lack of basic management in many lobster fisheries is the limited community support and associated difficulties in compliance. This is often associated with a lack of ongoing fishing or exclusive rights which would ensure that the fishers being asked to suffer short-term reductions in catch will be the beneficiaries in the longer term. Based on the positive Mexican experience in applying management controls in the 1950s, Seijo (1993) has noted that "a useful first step in these situations is for governments to provide some basic, ongoing community fishing rights at the community level". These issues of lack of support for management and illegal activity (taking of undersize and berried lobsters) were also evident in the case study fishery (de Lestang et al., 2012) through the 1960s, before exclusive fishing rights were issued and continued until transferability was well established.
While the lobster fisheries in the developed economies mostly now have rights-based management in place with biological and some effort controls, there has been limited uptake of the more complex market-based management systems which have now developed, despite their potential to significantly improve economic performance Caputi et al., 2015) . These more complex fishery management systems have however mostly developed in single legal jurisdictions (e.g. the Australian states, New Zealand) and their implementation in fisheries managed under more complex federal and state legal systems or multinational jurisdictions is likely to be more difficult. Nonetheless, the management effectiveness and improved economic outcomes under these control systems suggest they have general applicability to most lobster fisheries.
In many of the established lobster fisheries, the debate around these more active management strategies continues to be socially based and often relates to competition between fishing groups and potential impacts on younger fishers wishing to enter commercial fisheries (Acheson and Gardner, 2011) . Fishing communities are also concerned about loss of control over the fishery, creation of windfall profits for historical operators, and the potential for aggregation of fishing rights to create monopoly ownership, particularly under ITQ management (Copes and Charles, 2004) . While some of these concerns stem from local legal and social complexities, others have not been borne out by the experience in the case study fishery, particularly under the effort-control system. While these issues were also initially of concern in the WA lobster fishery (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) , the concerns raised decreased as the fishers began to understand that the increasing transfer values reflected the underlying profitability of their "lobster fishing businesses" and they were able to borrow to fund unit purchases in line with normal business practice. Further, under the TAE with ITEs system, new operators wanting to enter the fishery would typically build up a small unit holding through purchases then lease additional units sufficient to operate a small vessel. This process was easier for skilled skippers, who could then achieve aboveaverage catches, a process not legally possible under an ITQ system. This history of ownership of the fishing licences in the case study fishery is also relevant to the wider issue of loss of fishing community control over the fisheries (Copes and Charles, 2004) . That is, the transfer of licences to corporate bodies, apart from private fishing family companies, has not been evident through the TAE management period, despite the obvious profitability demonstrated by the P/E ratios being achieved. Historically, some of the processing companies have entered this market by purchasing units for lease back to active fishers in an attempt to guarantee their supply of lobsters; however, this did not become a significant activity under the TAE system. The apparent reason for this is that a fisher using leased pots does not have to legally land the product to the ITE owner (Processor). That is, the Government does not need to directly track individual vessel catches or landings, as the only practical compliance concern is to ensure the correct licensed fishing vessels and gear are operating through the season. Second, the major long-standing and most successful processor in the Western Australian fishery has historically been a large fishers' cooperative, which distributes its profits back to fishers and has had no incentive to accumulate fishing rights on its own behalf and compete with its shareholders.
While the previous TAE with ITEs avoided many of the concerns about new entrants and fishery ownership or control, the new ITQ system now in place is not likely to have these same social characteristics. That is, the experience with ITQs generally is that transfer to corporate ownership is more likely and leasing becomes common place . For these reasons, limits on aggregation of ownership to prevent monopolies developing are typically required. The experience in the New Zealand lobster fishery (Donohue and Barker, 2000) is that despite a maximum quota holding limit of 10%, fisher ownership diminished rapidly with corporate and processing companies controlling about half of the quota, 10 years after the introduction of ITQs. The contracting out of the catching of quotas has also led to concerns that fishers on small margins are less likely to show custodianship of the resource compared with owner operators. In addition, new social issues of greater risk taking at sea are now emerging in the Tasmanian fishery linked to non-fishing quota ownership and leasing of quotas (Emery et al., 2014) . This practice of leasing under ITQs also changes the relationship between quota owner and a lessee, because the Government compliance system tracks all catches and can ensure that all legal catches are landed to the quota holder. In this situation, quota-owners (including former fishers) naturally seek to maximize their return from their ownership of the fishing rights and lease fees can reach 50 -60% of the value of the catch, in effect making the vessel operator an employee skipper.
Performance of the effort-control system
The potential for effort increases under the early limited entry system was recognized early in the WA fishery and measures to reduce latent effort and control "effort creep" were instituted. Through this period, the competitive nature of fishing sometimes resulted in limited adherence to the fishing rules, with fishers repeatedly trying to capitalize on any loophole to increase their effort (Bowen and Hancock, 1989) . Further, their report noted "it is therefore imperative that a mechanism be established at the start of effort limitation which sets out a method for fishing capacity reduction to counterbalance the increases that inevitably occur". A second factor Review of lobster fishery management i31 that contributed to effort creep under the input control system was that as the fishery became more profitable through the 1980s and 1990s, many competitive fishers invested in bigger and faster vessels in an attempt to gain a greater share of the fishery output. This process, known as "capital stuffing" , results in a "rush to fish" (Emery et al., 2013) in which all operators are forced to compete or lose catch share. These larger more powerful vessels were able to achieve above-average catches by being able to move their full pot holding to areas of high abundance daily. While this factor was initially controlled to some extent by the rule that vessels had to have between 7 and 10 pots m 21 of vessel length to operate, it was later removed after political pressure from affected industry operators. While the capital stuffing in the case study fishery has largely been eliminated by the change to ITQs, the previous controls linking gear entitlements to vessel size remain relevant to other lobster fisheries using effort-based management systems.
While a series of adjustments to the fishery were made to overcome "effort creep" through the early development period, the first major test of the capacity of the limited-entry regime to actively manage the stock occurred when exploitation rates in the early 1990s (Wright et al., 2006) had reached high levels (70-75% annually) following the introduction of electronic technology (including GPS plotters, etc.). This caused significant depletion of breeding stocks, possibly below 20% of virgin levels (Hall and Chubb, 2001 ) and raised the possibility of recruitment overfishing. Despite the potentially high risks to the fishery, there was intense industry opposition to the planned management changes to recover breeding stock levels. While the package of new management measures in 1993/1994 proved successful and licence values quickly recovered, this experience illustrated the difficulties associated with achieving industry consensus in large fisheries when significant effort adjustments are required. In contrast, the more radical effort adjustments made in response to the puerulus settlement decline starting in 2007/2008 required similarly difficult negotiations, but were implemented quickly, with reasonable industry leadership support, due to the concerns about heavy fishing pressure continuing on the projected record-low stock levels.
These difficulties in making effective management changes under effort controls when high levels of latent effort and significant excess fishing capacity exist are likely to apply to many other effortmanaged commercial lobster fisheries and in most artisanal situations. The long-established Homarus fisheries in the United States, where catches and fishing effort have continually increased over a long period but are now suffering decreased recruitment and survival in some areas under climate change (Wahle et al., 2013) , are also likely to be in the above situation. In these situations, the case study experience strongly supports the need in all input control fisheries for automatic effort adjustments, so that management action to deal with significant changes in stock abundance is not delayed by having to first remove excess capacity.
Benefits from conversion to TAC with ITQ management
The case study experience from moving to ITQs is that this system can provide significant additional increases in economic performance. This occurred through the virtual elimination of the rush to fish, which reduced vessel operating costs and considerably improved the prices being achieved for lobsters (Caputi et al., 2014b . This was illustrated by the P/E valuations which were low at the time of TAC (ITQ) implementation, but recovered quickly back to the levels previously achieved under TAE system before the puerulus settlement collapse.
This experience suggests that many long-standing lobster fisheries that have stable catches, particularly if they can predict recruitment, could achieve much better economic performance under an ITQ system without compromising sustainability. However, such conversions from basic limited entry to more market-based system with ITEs (or ITQs) in fisheries and particularly where there is considerable excess fishing capacity can be expected to result in significant reductions in vessel numbers. Because these changes and the expected increase in licence values are likely to have significant socio-economic consequences for fishing communities and affect the future ownership of the fishery rights, the legislation to make these changes needs to anticipate and address these issues.
Lobster fishing rights and management
The creation of exclusive fishing rights in the WA lobster fishery flowed from limiting entry were ultimately formalized under the Fisheries Act (FRMA, 1994) and enhanced by the licence register where contract arrangements around ownership could be recorded. Notably, these "access rights" and associated administrative systems developed for the WA commercial fishery have most of the traits suggested for fishing rights by Gardner et al. (2013) and led to increasing industry support in the form of lower compliance and research costs which have improved management outcomes (Bowen, 1994) .
While the nature of the commercial access rights are specific to the Western Australian legal system, it has been noted that they are in effect very similar to the franchisee rights under franchise contract (Penn et al., 1997) which operate successfully in most countries where lobsters are fished. That is, the franchisee contract arrangements have a long legal history and because they operate in a wide variety of jurisdictions can provide a useful starting point where improved fishing rights are proposed, but locally contentious. A key aspect of franchisee "contracts" is that there are typically provisions for buyback of the individual enterprises, usually at market value, under this system. This aspect of the franchise contract equating to the "obligations" of Government after the fishing rights are issued is not often included directly in Fisheries management plans (Penn et al., 1997) , but would better protect all fisher's rights if significant restructuring of fisheries is needed to deal with common issues such as catch share changes between sectors or stock shifts under climate change. Second, while the franchise contracts usually have buy-back provisions, the secondary leasing of the operator rights is not generally a feature of these management systems. Noting that leasing is expected to increasingly transfer fishery income away from fishing communities and can have other negative social impacts (Emery et al., 2013) , the incorporation of the franchise contract principles in fisheries legislation may provide an effective legal basis to control these potentially negative effects and provide better outcomes for the wider community as the ultimate "owners" of the lobster resources. In addition to the franchisee contract matching commercial lobster fishing access rights, the model is also relevant to defining the rights of other fishers (sport and artisanal) and conservation groups seeking catch shares for inclusion in "not take" areas.
Conclusions
The review suggests that early adoption of tradable "access rights" rights similar to franchisee contracts in the case study fishery was a critical first step in gaining fisher support for management and the licence values created provide a useful indicator of fishery viability. The historical process where basic biological controls are enhanced with limited entry before developing sophisticated ITE or ITQ-based systems appears an effective and efficient pathway for fishery development with wider relevance. The case study experience has however shown that ITE and ITQ-based systems are inherently different in their operation and socio-economic consequences.
The ITE system appears to avoid many of the negative consequences often attributed to ITQs and suggests that they could be usefully applied where fishing community concerns are impeding management implementation. Notably, both ITE and ITQ systems have proved capable of significant fleet reductions to overcome the excess fishing capacity without the need for government financial involvement. However, the review shows that ITQ management has additional economic benefits, but involves a higher risk strategy to be applied with caution, where fisheries are operating at high levels of exploitation or stock estimates are unreliable.
While the case study experience with ITE and particularly ITQ-based management suggests that both are capable of generating significant economic benefits, the longer term impacts of these control systems on ownership of the fishing rights, the flow of benefits from fishing, and the resulting manageability of lobster stocks are questions yet to be answered.
